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Abstract 
Multi-informant approaches are thought to be key to clinical assessment. Classical theories of 
psychological measurements assume that only convergence among different informants’ 
reports allows for an estimate of the true nature and causes of clinical presentations. However, 
the integration of multiple accounts is fraught with problems because findings in child and 
adolescent psychiatry do not conform to the fundamental expectation of convergence. Indeed, 
reports provided by different sources (self, parents, teachers, peers) share little variance. 
Moreover, in some cases informant divergence may be meaningful and not error variance.  
In this review we give an overview of conceptual and theoretical foundations of valid multi-
informant assessment and discuss why our common concepts of validity need revaluation.   
keywords: multimethod assessment; cross-informant agreement; construct validity; 
incremental validity; meaningful divergence 
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„The problem is one of opposition between subjective and objective points of view. There is a tendency to seek 1 
an objective account of everything before admitting its reality. But often what appears to be a more subjective 2 
point of view cannot be accounted for in this way. So either the objective conception of the world is incomplete, 3 
or the subjective involves illusions that should be rejected.”  4 
Thomas Nagel, Subjective and Objective in Mortal Questions (1979) 5 
 6 
Imagine a parent consults a child psychologist because her son John has recently been 7 
displaying difficulties concentrating, headaches and irritability. The clinician may hypothesise 8 
that John’s symptoms are best explained by an anxiety disorder, but how does she collect 9 
relevant information to substantiate this diagnosis and to rule out alternative diagnoses?  10 
In order to get a comprehensive picture of John’s concerns across many different 11 
situations she chooses to ask John and different persons who know him – typically relatives, 12 
peers or teachers – to report on his symptoms. The clinician obtains self-reports from John 13 
and an informant-report from his mother (method 1 and 2). Moreover, she may use her 14 
observations of his behaviour during the mildly stressful clinical assessment (method 3) and 15 
interview his teacher about John’s behaviour at school (method 4). This method is commonly 16 
referred to as a multi-informant approach (De Los Reyes, 2013). Likely all perspectives may 17 
contribute valid observations about John’s concerns. Yet, would they tell a coherent story 18 
altogether? Interviewing multiple sources informs the assessment process on a variety of 19 
different symptom levels. However, a satisfactory convergence, is rarely attained because the 20 
relationship of informants’ reports is predominantly characterised by random noise (Burns & 21 
Haynes, 2006). Even if identical or parallel – i.e. psychometrically identical -- measures were 22 
applied (De Los Reyes, 2011), informants’ reports share little variance (see Achenbach, 23 
McConaughy, and Howell (1987) for a comprehensive meta-analysis of correspondence 24 
between informants in 119 studies): parents’ and teachers’ reports overlap by approximately 25 
15% for internalizing symptoms (with informants underestimating the presence of respective 26 
symptoms) and 30% for externalizing behaviour problems. The convergence of children’s and 27 
adults’ reports, however, circles around 20% for either condition (McConaughy, Stanger, & 28 
Achenbach, 1992) 29 
 4 
Clearly, diverging accounts have adverse effects on research findings and clinical 30 
judgments: First, they result in markedly varied epidemiological estimates leading researchers 31 
to over- or underestimate prevalence rates of specific disorders (s. Polanczyk, Willcutt, 32 
Salum, Kieling, and Rohde (2014) for an a meta-analytic overview of heterogeneity in 33 
prevalence estimates in Attention Deficity Hyperactivity Disorders). Moreover, a valid 34 
evaluation of the success of clinical trials is likely to fail (Kolko & Kazdin, 1993). For 35 
instance, in 1990 the Infant Health and Development program was initiated in order to reduce 36 
health risks that are associated with low birth weight. The evaluation of this intervention was 37 
based on reports provided by mothers. These reports, however, were confounded by maternal 38 
education, thus their ability to detect and verbally express their child’s health issues. It is 39 
likely, that the programme had an impact on mothers’ sensitivity for the concerns of their 40 
children. Ignoring this relationship, however, led to a pattern of results where the 41 
experimental group of this randomised controlled trial had worse outcomes than the control 42 
group (see Kraemer et al. (2003) for an overview).  43 
Second, unrecognised clinical conditions prevent an early intervention that may inhibit 44 
a) the development of a full-blown expression of the disorder or b) its chronicity (Luby, 2012; 45 
Offord et al., 1996). Especially with regards to internalizing disorders such as anxiety 46 
disorders a large proportion of children and adolescents is considered to remain unidentified 47 
(Pine, Helfinstein, Bar-Haim, Nelson, & Fox, 2009). Decreased levels of sensitivity may be 48 
traced back to the observation that some children do not express their concerns, thus 49 
informants have difficulties inferring the children’s concerns (e. g.(Weisbrot, Gadow, 50 
DeVincent, & Pomeroy, 2005).  51 
Third, low cross-informant agreement raises questions about how to classify mental 52 
disorders. For instance, John’s recent irritability may have gotten him into trouble with his 53 
peers due to his temper outbursts. To his teacher such behaviour may present as a symptom of 54 
a conduct disorder. John, however, may report that his excessive worry made him be more 55 
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easily annoyed by others. How – on a general level – should a condition be classified that one 56 
informant reports as externalising and the subject itself as internalising disorder?  What 57 
becomes evident is that in order to estimate true nomological relations of the constructs 58 
assessed, source effects need to be partitioned out from the measures, because associated 59 
biases will likely distort their covariance (see Greenbaum, Decrick, Prange, and Friedman 60 
(1994) for a comprehensive examination of source effects on the relation of internalising, 61 
thought, attention and externalising problems).  62 
This so-called grand discrepancy (De Los Reyes, Thomas, Goodman, & Kundey, 63 
2013) presents the clinician with a dilemma: Empirical science assumes that there is such a 64 
thing as truth. To the clinician in our example John’s recent condition has a true underlying 65 
cause. She applies multiple instruments that are specifically designed to identify this cause (e. 66 
g. anxiety disorder). Each of these measures underwent the process of validation – a test of 67 
whether the empirical relations between test scores match the relations in the nomological 68 
network (Borsboom, 2005). Theory holds that each of the measures properly represents the 69 
construct of interest. However, if they differ so radically – which is the correct one? And, if 70 
she uses all four measures that means that neither is correct on its own (Campbell & Fiske, 71 
1959). In any case, some part of the theory seems wrong. Yet, there is a decision to take: in 72 
order to provide John with a diagnosis that accurately determines the cause and nature of his 73 
complaints and reflects the demands of effective therapy the clinician has to meet the needs of 74 
clinical pragmatics and sacrifice her theoretical doubts.  75 
Experience and empirical evidence tell us that clinicians are inclined to make 76 
diagnostic decisions that are in line with parent provided information, although parent- and 77 
child-provided information share little variance (DiBartolo, Albano, Barlow, & Heimberg, 78 
1998; Grills & Ollendick, 2003; Luby, 2012; Youngstrom et al., 2004). Yet, there has been no 79 
scientific consensus on algorithms that appropriately reconcile diverging reports (De Los 80 
Reyes et al., 2013; Offord et al., 1996). Consequently, the question of how to derive valid 81 
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estimates of child characteristics on the basis of collateral information has been left 82 
unresolved. As a first step towards a solution of this challenging status quo we give an 83 
overview of a) conceptual and theoretical foundations of valid multi-informant assessment 84 
and b) discuss why our common concepts of validity need revaluation. Here, we focus on 85 
child and adolescent clinical assessments in particular, because multi-informant approaches 86 
are of fundamental importance in this population. 87 
The problem of truth. 88 
The fact that psychological constructs are of hypothetical nature implies that they are 89 
never directly observable. Similarly, for no form of child and adolescent psychopathology a 90 
mechanism has been uncovered that allows an accurate diagnostic test. With the use of a wide 91 
range of instruments (interviews, questionnaires, standardised tests, behavioural observation 92 
and biophysiological measures) we translate the hypothesised attributes into recognisable and 93 
observable indicators (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). Our development of these instruments is 94 
optimally driven by two theoretical prerequisites: (1) the existence of the construct of interest 95 
and (2) hypotheses about how variations in the construct causally produce variations in the 96 
outcomes, that we measure. We cannot measure a trait that does not exist (Borsboom, 2005). 97 
Also, if it exists, yet does not produce causal variations in our criterion, we may measure 98 
something completely different or nothing at all (see Block (1995) for an overview of the 99 
Jingle-Jangle-Jungle fallacy). 100 
Measurement instruments can be broadly defined as vehicles “(…) that uncover 101 
psychological attributes and procedures of objects and transform these attributes into 102 
symbols that can be processed (…)” (Schmitt, 2006). Yet, by definition, these symbols are 103 
imperfect. Psychological measurement theories put forward that each person has a true score 104 
on the attribute assessed. Evidently, the average observed score of a person is only an 105 
approximation of the latent, hypothesised construct. Beyond variance that is entirely 106 
attributable to the trait of interest (Judd, Smith & Kidder, 1991; Schmidt & Hunter, 1999), 107 
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this reflection, however, is assumed to contain another component: In Classical Test Theory 108 
(CTT;(Lord, Novick, & Birnbaum, 1968) any discrepancy between the hypothetical true score 109 
and an observed estimate is explained by measurement error, a random source of variance 110 
(see Sutcliffe (1965) for the platonic true score interpretation). Other than the estimate of the 111 
true score, the error term varies unsystematically and becomes virtually zero when the number 112 
of measurements tends to infinity. In accordance with this equation from CTT, maximizing 113 
the number of measurements implies approximating the truth. More informants, in this case, 114 
increase the a) reliability and b) validity of our measurement (Roberts & Caspi, 2001). 115 
Assessments in child and adolescent psychiatric contexts are adapted to this logic by 116 
combining multiple informants’ reports. However, little convergence among informants’ 117 
reports poses large challenges to the validity of multi-informant assessments. Two different 118 
explanations may explain small proportions of convergence: First, if informants’ reports share 119 
approximately 20-30% common variance, this proportion – according to CTT – is traceable to 120 
the latent trait assessed (see Figure 1 A), because the overlap of different methods depends on 121 
how much trait specific variance each captures in relation to error variance. Then, 70-80% 122 
mirror error variance. The second approach is more fundamental: The conceptualisation of the 123 
true score as the expected value of observed scores is based on principles of the theory of 124 
errors. Generally, this theory states that repeated measurements of the exact same, constant 125 
entity lead to different results, because every measurement is characterised by error variance 126 
(Edgeworth, 1888). This principle, however, was mostly applied in astronomy and yields a 127 
major fallacy, while being transferred to psychological assessment contexts. In this case, 128 
observed scores are collected at the level of the individual and – other than flipping a coin– do 129 
not belong to a set of repeated measurements with the same instrument. Even under 130 
circumstances of repeated measures, psychometry will not satisfy the need for a fixed true 131 
score: Each measurement itself has an impact on the traits assessed, because humans – unlike 132 
celestial bodies – learn and memorise their previous responses or tire out. From this 133 
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perspective, a true score cannot ever be attained at the individual level unless the subject 134 
“were repeatedly tested in a long run of testing occasions with intermediate brainwashing 135 
and time travel” (Borsboom, 2005; p. 45). 136 
 Against this backdrop, we may either conclude that (1) our methods are 137 
predominantly characterised by random noise (Campbell & Fiske, 1959) or (2) that CTT may 138 
not prove to be an adequate  treatment of psychological test scores (Borsboom, 2005). This 139 
implies that neither method appropriately and validly mirrors the construct of interest. 140 
Similarly, it is possible that at least one method may not capture the trait assessed (Campbell 141 
& Fiske, 1959). In both cases, the capacity of each account to indicate construct validity is 142 
highly decreased because nomological relations of the constructs of interest are distorted by 143 
variance caused by distinct sources (Dirks, Boyle, & Georgiades, 2011; Dirks, De Los Reyes, 144 
Briggs-Gowan, Cella, & Wakschlag, 2012; Greenbaum et al., 1994). Beyond that, it is 145 
difficult to test incremental validity. That would be given when the predictability of a specific 146 
criterion is increased beyond that provided by an established method (e.g. parent-report).  147 
However, the idea that error terms may be of systematic – rather than unsystematic – 148 
nature, further challenges our attempt to summarise individual scores within one equation. 149 
In spite of lacking convergence, individual measures uniquely contribute to the 150 
prediction of trait-specific behaviours (Asendorpf, Banse, & Mücke, 2002; Egloff & 151 
Schmukle, 2002; Hirschmüller, Egloff, Nestler, & Back, 2013). Interestingly, not only 152 
information provided by different informants is characterised by little amounts of shared 153 
variance. Also, specific trait estimates based on different methods filled in by one and the 154 
same person show very little to no convergence (e.g. implicit and explicit measures of 155 
shyness;(Asendorpf et al., 2002). This may allow disentangling the 70-80% into meaningful 156 
components of inter-informant variation (De Los Reyes, Alfano, & Beidel, 2010; Kraemer et 157 
al., 2003). Such perspective puts emphasis on epistemological issues – i.e. their ability to 158 
represent reality – of the construct under investigation because the divergence of different 159 
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accounts may be meaningful because they compensate each other’s shortcomings by 160 
complementary information. This information – in turn – leads to increased levels of 161 
explained trait variance. From this standpoint, traditional definitions of traits (Campbell & 162 
Fiske, 1959) may not apply, because variance attributable to the construct of interest is 163 
uniquely linked to specific determinants of the individual of each informant (e.g. situations in 164 
which behaviours are observed).  165 
Truth matters. 166 
With respect to multi-informant approaches, research has shown, that the act of 167 
reporting on others’ or own states or traits may be biased by a variety of distinct sources like 168 
age-related limitations to introspection (Luby, Belden, Sullivan, & Spitznagel, 2007) or 169 
parental psychopathology (see Müller, Achtergarde, and Furniss (2011) for a comprehensive 170 
examination of the depression-distortion hypothesis). These factors are assumed to interfere 171 
with informants’ ratings of the characteristics assessed. As a consequence informants may not 172 
share the same understanding of which indicators (i. e. behaviours, states) represent the 173 
construct of interest in general. Or, beyond a mutual understanding, informants may differ in 174 
their abilities and motivation to extract relevant observations from the wealth of events in 175 
everyday life (Cairns & Green, 1979). However, in the absence of a solid theory that explains 176 
processes of divergence, this work has led to mostly inconsistent results.  177 
Yet, the fact that the vast majority of child and adolescent mental disorders is never 178 
entirely consistent across time, situations or methods (Bögels et al., 2010; Dirks et al., 2012; 179 
Kraemer et al., 2003) may help uncover explanatory mechanisms. This notion has been 180 
conceptualised as relative consistency, systematic behavioural variations determined by a set 181 
of situation-specific constraints. Herein may lie the cause for low cross-informant agreement 182 
as well as and the solution for this ambiguity. Variations allow to uncover the mechanisms 183 
that generate differential behaviour (Schmitt, 2006) and once uncovered, these mechanisms 184 
may help to reconcile or to integrate conflicting accounts.  185 
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Literature suggests at least two mechanisms may account for systematic variations 186 
across multiple informants: First, relevant behavioural indicators may not be equally available 187 
for all informants (Kraemer et al., 2003; Vazire, 2010). Thus, not all informants make 188 
inferences based on the same knowledge, yet their perspectives contain equally valid 189 
information for the assessment. Second, the particular approach of each informant or method 190 
may trigger different responses in the assessee. This issue has been extensively studied under 191 
the umbrella of multidetermination of behaviour (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). 192 
The idea that the individual approach of each informant may prompt different 193 
behaviours in the assessee may be best illustrated with our example. John’s self-reported 194 
sleeplessness (method 1) and irritability might reflect his anxiety, yet both may also result 195 
from excessive computer-gaming sessions or hyperactivity. At home, John may progressively 196 
shut himself away from his family and this withdrawal is likely to be interpreted as a sign of 197 
anxiety or depression by his mother. Beyond that, his mother’s report (method 2) may be 198 
biased by her motivation to present as a caring parent thereby exaggerating her worries and 199 
adding to John’s actual symptoms. Contrasted with severe cases the clinician saw earlier that 200 
day, her spontaneous behavioural observations (method 3) may underscore John’s current 201 
impairment. Moreover, because he feels uncomfortable presenting as timid and nervous 202 
towards a stranger, he will cover his anxiety. Finally – as outlined above – John’s anxiety may 203 
present to his teacher as an externalising condition. However, the teacher’s impression 204 
(method 4) of John’s behaviour may be influenced by the sympathy for his student. If John 205 
has been an excellent student so far, the teacher may give his recent agitation a sympathetic 206 
consideration.  207 
 Clearly, each measurement depends on its respective source. Generalisability Theory 208 
(GT;(Cronbach, Gleser, Nanda, & Rajaratnam, 1972) was established as a theoretical 209 
framework to investigate the effects of multidetermination on convergence among 210 
information sources (e.g. informants, methods). According to GT, each sample of 211 
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measurements represents a universe of all possible measurements (Cardinet, Tourneur, & 212 
Allal, 1976). With the assumption of the universe being infinite, two measurements cannot 213 
ever be identical. However, central to GT is the issue to what degree observed scores match 214 
average scores obtained under all possible circumstances. Here, variance of a test score is 215 
distinguishable into several factors, that were carefully derived from theoretical and practical 216 
considerations. 217 
Aggregating across different informants’ perspectives – and thereby across time, situations 218 
and methods – leads to a clearer reflection of the diagnostically relevant factor by controlling 219 
for multiple determinants of human behaviour (Brown, 1910; Spearman, 1910). Yet, how can 220 
these meaningful determinants be translated into research practice and clinical assessments? 221 
The introduction of Campbell’s and Fiske’s (1959) multitrait-multimethod matrix was a 222 
milestone for the estimation of validity of assessments based on multiple judgments. It allows 223 
contrasting variance unique to the perspective of an informant (i.e. perceptual biases due to 224 
differential presentation of symptoms across situations, person-situation-interaction) and 225 
variance attributable to the latent trait (i. e. consensual views on the basis of correlations 226 
among different assessments). Essential to this framework is the use of converging accounts 227 
as indicators of construct validity. The authors state that correlations among different methods 228 
of the same trait (convergent validity) should be high. The degree of this coefficient, however, 229 
has not been benchmarked. How can this concept be put to the test? 230 
Jöreskog (1969) suggests to partition distinct facets of variance by a covariance 231 
structure modeling approach, i.e. confirmatory factor analyses (CFA). This analysis allows 232 
disentangling trait, source and error variance simultaneously in each individual symptom 233 
rating. An assessment is considered to be valid, if trait variance outweighs source variance. 234 
Only in this case the measurement is not inflated by variance attributable to the informants 235 
and the assessment allows to generalise across informants’ individual reports (Eid, 236 
Lischetzke, Nussbeck, & Trierweiler, 2003). However, studies that systematically review the 237 
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ratio of trait and source variance are few and specific patterns of results indicate the 238 
inappropriateness of MTMM or GT conceptualisations of trait variance for multi-informant 239 
assessments. Burns & Haynes (2006) demonstrate that in specific cases, generalisation is 240 
possible only across one set of informants: For instance, parent-ratings may consist of 10% 241 
trait and 83% source variance, whereas teacher-ratings indicate 56% trait and 28% source 242 
variance (Burns, Walsh, & Gomez, 2003; Gomez, Burns, Walsh, & De Moura, 2003). 243 
Whether strong source effects reflect situation specificity of child behaviour or measurements 244 
that are predominantly influenced by biases may – according to the authors – only be clarified 245 
with two separate CFAs: one specifying situations at school (e.g. reports provided by teachers 246 
and peers) and another specifying situations at home (e.g. reports provided by mothers and 247 
fathers; see Figure 1 B). If the strong source effects in the first analysis result from behaviour 248 
that is situation specific, then each CFA should lead to an increase of trait over source 249 
variance.  250 
 The approach of GT sets out to maximise variance attributable to the latent trait of 251 
interest. In some cases, however, it is impossible to model distinct situation specific 252 
behaviours (e.g. at school and at home) in one mathematical model, because effects of 253 
contextual variations of specific traits cannot be separated from symptom ratings that are 254 
highly contaminated by bias (Burns & Hayes, 2005). Thus, a more specific approach is 255 
necessary to capture the logic of highly, yet meaningfully, disagreeing reports. 256 
In contrast to MTMM the Mix and Match approach (Kraemer et al., 2003) makes use 257 
of diverging accounts to increase the validity of the measure. It is not the sheer mass of 258 
information that reduces inaccuracy, because an infinite number of correlated (collinear) 259 
accounts cannot correct for shortcomings of each other’s reports. Such a mathematical model 260 
implies that informant-reports are never interchangeably useable. 261 
The authors hold that fusing diverging, independent perspectives on one individual 262 
helps to capture the whole diversity of possible indicators of the construct, thereby offsetting 263 
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biases of each individual informant.  Informants’ reports are suggested to emerge from a 264 
function of three orthogonal dimensions and a random error term: In line with GT, in addition 265 
to variance explained by an unsystematic error term, unshared variance between informants 266 
may be further divided into (1) information that is unique to that informant’s perspective (e.g. 267 
self vs. other) and (2) information that is unique to environmental circumstances, i.e. the 268 
context under which symptoms may be displayed (e.g. school vs. home). Consequently, a lack 269 
of convergence may be explained with the fact that one informant may have observed valid 270 
information that others do not have, which leads to less congruent accounts. Conceptualised 271 
on the grounds of linear algebra, the clinician may pinpoint the location of John’s most 272 
approximate score if she maximised the number of non-collinear informants. Particularly, if 273 
the clinician assumed the trait, context and perspective to be valid dimensions of an 274 
informant’s report, she will need at least three independent (orthogonally interrelated) sources 275 
to triangulate John’s most approximate score on the attribute assessed.  276 
According to this understanding, the clinician in our example can consider herself 277 
lucky if the three applied methods are incongruent and contribute unique and essential 278 
evidence to the picture, and the picture gets sharper the less correlated the perspectives are 279 
(see Figure 1 C). Only in this case, divergence among informants’ reports is meaningful. 280 
Against this backdrop, the idea of CTT and GT begins to unravel because truth cannot 281 
accurately result from aggregation across multiple measurements. From the perspective of 282 
clinical activities, this may sound paradoxical. Yet, in terms of research, it leads to an increase 283 
of trait-specific variance by partition of variance underlying different informants’ reports. By 284 
doing so, the aim of the clinical assessment (e.g. diagnostic decision, treatment response) 285 
gains in predictability. In clinical reality, however, the clinician is still lacking a set of 286 
operations that allow her to translate this evidence into a real-life, clear-cut outcome.   287 
 288 
<< insert Figure 1 here >> 289 
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 290 
So, truth lies in the eye of the beholder? 291 
The Mix and Match approach demonstrates that different reports may tell different, 292 
but complementary parts of the story (Klonsky & Oltmanns, 2002). Yet, how does the 293 
clinician know that the divergence is meaningful and not simply due to error? 294 
The Self-Other Knowledge Asymmetry model (SOKA; Vazire, 2010) provides a 295 
framework of moderators to trial the differential predictive value of reports made by 296 
informants relative to those by the subject him/herself. In contrast to previously reported 297 
research, this perspective puts emphasis on the question about what specific kinds of 298 
attributes of the characteristics assessed are more precisely reported by others compared to the 299 
subject. Our clinician may significantly benefit from this approach as she may interview John, 300 
his mother and his teacher on differential aspects of his characteristics.  301 
 Based on Funder’s (1995) realistic accuracy model an accurate estimate of the trait 302 
assessed is achieved, if four factors are consecutively realised during an assessment. First, 303 
John has to express behaviourally relevant indicators of the construct of interest. If we 304 
assumed he had an anxiety disorder, these could be avoidance, withdrawal and heightened 305 
vigilance. Second, these behaviours need to be available to his mother, teacher or the 306 
clinician. Third, any informant needs to detect these relevant indicators. Finally, these 307 
indicators need to be validly utilised by each informant. All four factors are multiplicatively 308 
related, stating that if one of them is missing (i. e. equals zero), an accurate informant rating 309 
cannot be reached (Funder, 1995, 2012). Interindividual differences of informants’ judgments 310 
are assumed to be pronounced within the availability and detection components. In particular, 311 
Vazire (2010) makes two predictions: First, highly observable behaviours (e.g. extraversion-312 
related talkativeness) are partly better picked up by informants, whereas traits low in 313 
observability (e.g. anxiety) are more comprehensively reported by the subject itself. Second, 314 
self- and informant ratings may have differential predictive value for traits high in 315 
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evaluativeness – socially (un)desirable traits whose judgment poses a threat to the self-esteem 316 
of the assessee (e.g. intelligence). 317 
In accordance with the predictions derived from the SOKA model, self-reports most 318 
accurately predicted neuroticism and in comparison informant-reports more accurately 319 
predicted extraversion and traits that were related to the intellectual abilities of the assessee 320 
(Vazire, 2010). 321 
The evidence from this study mirrors findings in child and adolescent 322 
psychopathology research: Internalizing conditions (e.g. anxiety, depression) are assumed to 323 
be accurately reported by the child or adolescent itself (Silverman & Ollendick, 2005). 324 
Evidently, the self has a highly advantaged approach to relevant information in this case 325 
because these conditions are largely characterised by cognitive and affective processes that 326 
project little into overt behaviours. With regards to externalizing conditions, parent reports of 327 
oppositional symptoms uniquely contribute to the ODD diagnosis in addition to child-reports 328 
(Angold & Costello, 2000). Moreover, in the assessment of ADHD (combined 329 
hyperactive/impulsive subtype) the joint use of teacher- and parent-reports exceeds variance 330 
explained by parent-report alone, but the assessment of either subtype on its own did not 331 
profit from combining teacher- and parent-report (Owens & Hoza, 2003). However, in line 332 
with the suggestion made by Burns and Haynes (2006) the validity of teacher reports 333 
increases if only behaviours shown in the classroom were considered (Smith, Pelham Jr, 334 
Gnagy, Molina, & Evans, 2000).  335 
Also, for traits high in evaluativeness such as social skills both teacher- and peer-336 
ratings demonstrated incremental value in a sample of third- to five-graders (Kwon, Kim, & 337 
Sheridan, 2012).      338 
A framework towards the integration of meaningful divergence.  339 
Another – perhaps more radical – perspective on the divergence of different measures 340 
of the same construct is provided by dual-process theories of human behaviour and cognition. 341 
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These theories suggest, that specific behaviours may be described as a function of two distinct 342 
mechanisms (e.g.(Kahneman, 2003) 343 
To illustrate, Back, Schmukle, and Egloff (2009) introduced the Behavioural Process 344 
Model of Personality (BPMP). This model extents the Reflective-Impulsive Model of 345 
decision making (see Strack and Deutsch (2004) for an overview) to the domain of 346 
personality. According to the BPMP, stable individual differences in social behaviour can be 347 
understood as the result of the typical functioning (across time and multiple situations) of 348 
reflective processes (how people typically perceive and categorise situations, which 349 
behavioural options they prefer, and how they deliberately realise these preferences) and 350 
impulsive processes (how situational cues are automatically processed, and what kinds of 351 
actions are automatically performed), which jointly trigger social behaviour.  352 
These stable individual differences in information-processing also affect individuals’ 353 
beliefs about themselves (i.e. their self-concepts). Presumably, individual differences in the 354 
typical operation of reflective processes can be translated into differences in propositional 355 
representations of the self (i.e., the explicit self-concept of personality), which are measured 356 
with standard direct measures (e.g., questionnaires). The typical functioning of impulsive 357 
processes, by contrast, leads to chronic links between semantic network elements, and thus, 358 
differences in associative representations of the self (i.e., the implicit self-concept of 359 
personality), which are assessed with indirect measures (e.g., Implicit Association tests for 360 
assessing personality).  361 
Our example again serves to illustrate how reflective and impulsive processes 362 
distinctively manifest within one person. The clinician asks John to fill in a questionnaire 363 
about his experienced levels of anxiety. Also, she indirectly assesses his anxiety with an 364 
implicit test where he is asked to sort words of anxious and non-anxious content to categories 365 
of the self or other respectively. Because John wants to remain his image as someone who is 366 
confident or because he may trace back his symptoms to a physiological cause or simply 367 
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because he feels uncomfortable talking about his concerns he may (deliberately) underscore 368 
his recent levels of anxiety in his self-report. The implicit test, however, allows to control for 369 
faking tendencies or response biases due to low levels of face validity. Also, this approach 370 
uncovers automatic and non-conscious aspects of John’s implicit self-concept that he cannot 371 
be aware of. These non-conscious aspects may include processes of evaluative conditioning. 372 
Here emotional contents of words or objects are semantically associated with another 373 
stimulus. In our example words like afraid, nervous, anxious, uncertain or fearful may be tied 374 
to John’s implicit self-representations thus leading to quicker reaction times in the sorting 375 
task, when anxious words need to be paired with the self vs. other. As a consequence, he may 376 
provide the clinician with two estimates of his anxiety that do not overlap at all.  377 
Following this line of reasoning, individual differences in the explicit and implicit 378 
self-concept, as measured by direct and indirect tests of personality, are condensations of 379 
typical differences in reflective and impulsive processes that predict social behaviour. Both 380 
may be conceptualised as functional subfacets of the constructs of interest. It then follows that 381 
implicit and explicit measures of e.g. anxiety may be only slightly correlated (even when 382 
corrected for unreliability of measurement) because both operate at distinct levels of 383 
perception, thus differ in their explicability. Moreover, each measure predicts unique variance 384 
in behaviour (see Figure 1 D). For example, Asendorpf et al. (2002) showed that an IAT for 385 
measuring shyness uniquely predicted spontaneous shyness behaviours whereas self-reported 386 
shyness uniquely predicted controlled aspects of shyness behaviours (so-called double 387 
dissociation). Similar findings were obtained by (Egloff & Schmukle, 2002) in the domain of 388 
anxiety and by Back et al. (2009) for the ‘Big Five’ personality traits (see also(Hirschmüller 389 
et al., 2013). Thus, the divergence of two measures constitutes no problem at all – to the 390 
contrary, the divergence is meaningful and allows for incremental and unique predictions of 391 
behaviour.  392 
 393 
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Discussion 394 
In view of the fact that informants’ reports are characterised by little agreement, we set 395 
out to review concepts of validity in multi-informant assessment contexts. Our aim was to 396 
exemplify why these concepts impose limits for collateral data integration and to present a 397 
framework that allows combining diverging assessment information for a valid 398 
comprehensive clinical judgment. 399 
We demonstrated that in contrast to general assumptions made by Classical Test 400 
Theory (Lord & Novick, 1968), Generalisability Theory (Cronbach, Gleser, Nanda & 401 
Rajaratnam, 1972) and the Multitrait-Multimethod approach (Campbell & Fiske, 1959) trait 402 
variance and trait indicative behaviours can be incrementally predicted by different reports 403 
that share little to no variance (Mix and Match approach, Kraemer et al., 2003; Self-Other 404 
Knowledge Asymmetry model, Vazire, 2010; Behavioural Process Model of Personality, 405 
Back, Schmukle & Egloff 2009). At least two aspects in this discussion of validity, however, 406 
warrant further attention: 407 
First, the meaningful combination of informants’ reports leads to increases of trait 408 
variance up to levels of 50% in Kraemer et al. (2003). But, a benchmark that defines the 409 
maximally possible amount of explained trait variance has not yet been established. With that 410 
said, one could only speculate about the nature of the remaining 50%. With regards to the 411 
multidetermination of human behaviour, trait indicators were reported to have small effect 412 
sizes in the prediction of behaviour (Ahadi & Diener, 1989). Similarly, given the high 413 
contextual variability of clinical conditions (e.g.(Bögels et al., 2010) we may assume that 414 
much higher levels of explained trait variance cannot be reached. However, because Kraemer 415 
et al. (2003) did not control for the unreliability of each measure applied and not all 416 
informants were provided with questionnaires that had 1) the same psychometric properties, 417 
2) similar contents and 3) constant time frames of symptom reports, it is likely that in this 418 
particular study the unexplained variance mirrors methodological artefacts to great extents. 419 
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 Second, with regards to the BPMP it is possible that not all indicative behaviours are 420 
captured by established measures of clinical and research practice. This question of content 421 
validity, however, is difficult to answer, because research in this domain exhibits a strong 422 
single-method approach. When it comes to the validation of new instruments researchers 423 
repeatedly chose to establish how much variance is shared with a gold-standard measure of 424 
the same construct. The tautology of this approach becomes highly evident, when the items of 425 
both methods are semantically similar (or even the same). Such an approach sheds light on 426 
very specific aspects of the trait assessed. As a result, little evidence is unveiled that may 427 
inform construct validity and conclusions are restricted to this operationalization, because 428 
very specific aspects of the construct assessed are illuminated (Burns & Hayes, 2005). From 429 
this perspective, high levels of clinical, pathophysiological and behavioural heterogeneity 430 
may be a result of little construct validity (see Corvin et al. (2013) for a discussion of 431 
heterogeneity in schizophrenia). This aspect emphasises the importance of divergence on a 432 
more general level: Evidently, the agreement between John’s mother and his teacher about his 433 
anxiety alone is not sufficient for a valid assessment. Importantly, their reports need to 434 
discriminate between the trait assessed and other factors. Yet, this step in the process of 435 
validation is much more difficult to achieve. The divergence of two methods indicates their 436 
discriminant validity only to the extent that the attributes under investigation are truly 437 
unrelated. In the absence of valid measures, a solid theory that specifies nomological relations 438 
among different constructs is therefore indispensible (Schmitt, 2006). With regards to the 439 
descriptive approach applied in clinical research, this line, however, is blurred. The clinician 440 
from our example relies on a lot of questions about phenomena that are related to an anxiety 441 
disorder. But these phenomena may also have a range of other causes (Pickles & Angold, 442 
2003; Block, 1995). For instance, irritability is represented in six different psychiatric 443 
childhood disorders – both, internalising and externalising (Stringaris, 2015). The overlap of 444 
symptoms across different conditions may present as diagnostic overshadowing bias to 445 
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clinical reality. Also, anxiety disorders are likely to be missed by clinicians in children with 446 
Autism Spectrum Disorders, because both conditions are characterised by irritability, fear and 447 
avoidance (Mason & Scior, 2004). Similarly, in research designs that explore the incremental 448 
value of an additional measurement, the problem of criterion contamination arises (Garb, 449 
2005). A criterion is labeled as contaminated if predictors and criteria are not independent of 450 
each other. For instance, if we aim at predicting the clinical diagnosis from clinical files and 451 
parent reports, contamination occurs if the clinician based her judgment on this information.  452 
 Promising findings about the complementary use of multi-informant assessment in 453 
child and adolescent psychiatry illuminate an encouraging research direction in this field. 454 
Future studies, however, need to carefully control for methodological confounds in order to 455 
validly estimate the incremental value of each informants’ report. 456 
  457 
Conclusion 458 
In classical theories of psychological measurements only convergence among different 459 
informants’ reports indicates an approximation of the true nature and causes of mental health 460 
concerns. However, behavioural problems present themselves in different ways across 461 
different situations. As a consequence, divergence among informants’ reports is considered to 462 
be meaningful, if each perspective uniquely explains trait-related variance or contributes to 463 
the prediction of behaviour. Different informants tell different, yet complementary parts of 464 
one true story and it remains an important task of clinical practice and research to develop 465 
sophisticated algorithms that allow a meaningful integration of diverging information.  466 
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Figure Caption 467 
Figure 1. Heuristic illustrations of different concepts of validity proposed by Classical Test 468 
Theory (A), Generalisability Theory (B), the Mix and Match Approach (C) and the 469 
Behavioural Process Model of Personality (D).  470 
 471 
Note. X and Y: informants/methods; X1/Y1 and X2/Y2 multiple assessments across same 472 
sources;  Z = construct assessed; ZA and ZB = functional subfacets of the constructs assessed; 473 
dashed lines denote trait-variance exclusively explained by one informant/method.   474 
 22 
References 475 
 476 
Achenbach, T. M., McConaughy, S. H., & Howell, C. T. (1987). Child/adolescent 477 
behavioural and emotional problems: implications of cross-informant correlations for 478 
situational specificity. Psychological bulletin, 101(2), 213.  479 
Angold, A., & Costello, E. J. (2000). The child and adolescent psychiatric assessment 480 
(CAPA). Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 39(1), 481 
39-48.  482 
Asendorpf, J. B., Banse, R., & Mücke, D. (2002). Double dissociation between implicit and 483 
explicit personality self-concept: the case of shy behaviour. Journal of personality and 484 
social psychology, 83(2), 380.  485 
Back, M. D., Schmukle, S. C., & Egloff, B. (2009). Predicting actual behaviour from the 486 
explicit and implicit self-concept of personality. Journal of personality and social 487 
psychology, 97(3), 533.  488 
Block, J. (1995). A contrarian view of the five-factor approach to personality description. 489 
Psychological Bulletin, 117(2), 187. 490 
Bögels, S. M., Alden, L., Beidel, D. C., Clark, L. A., Pine, D. S., Stein, M. B., & Voncken, M. 491 
(2010). Social anxiety disorder: questions and answers for the DSM‐ V. Depression 492 
and anxiety, 27(2), 168-189.  493 
Borsboom, D. (2005). Measuring the mind: Conceptual issues in contemporary 494 
psychometrics. Cambridge University Press. 495 
Brown, W. (1910). Some Experimental Results in the Correlation of Mental Abilities1. 496 
British Journal of Psychology, 1904-1920, 3(3), 296-322.  497 
Burns, G. L., & Haynes, S. N. (2006). Clinical psychology: Construct validation with multiple  498 
 23 
sources of information and multiple settings. In M. Eid & E. Diener (Eds.), Handbook 499 
of multimethod measurement in psychology (pp. 401–418). Washington, DC: 500 
American Psychological Association. 501 
Burns, G. L., Walsh, J. A., & Gomez, R. (2003). Convergent and discriminant validity of trait 502 
and source effects in ADHD-inattention and hyperactivity/impulsivity measures across 503 
a 3-month interval. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 31(5), 529-541.  504 
Cairns, R., & Green, J. (1979). How to assess personality and social patterns: Observations or 505 
ratings. The analysis of social interactions: Methods, issues, and illustrations, 209-506 
226.  507 
Campbell, D. T., & Fiske, D. W. (1959). Convergent and discriminant validation by the 508 
multitrait-multimethod matrix. Psychological bulletin, 56(2), 81.  509 
Cardinet, J., Tourneur, Y., & Allal, L. (1976). The symmetry of generalizability theory: 510 
Applications to educational measurement. Journal of Educational Measurement, 119-511 
135.  512 
Corvin, A., Buchanan, R. W., Carpenter, W. T., Kennedy, J. L., Keshavan, M. S.,  513 
MacDonald, A. W., Sass, L. & Wessa, M. (2013). Which aspects of heterogeneity are 514 
useful to translational success? In S. M. Silverstein, B. Moghaddam & T. Wykes (Ed.), 515 
Schizophrenia – Evolution and Synthesis (pp. 77-92). Cambridge, Massachusetts: The 516 
MIT Press. 517 
Cronbach, Gleser, G., Nanda, H., & Rajaratnam, N. (1972). Theory of generalizability for 518 
scores and profiles. The dependability of behavioural measurements: New York: 519 
Wiley. 520 
Cronbach, L. J., & Meehl, P. E. (1955). Construct validity in psychological tests. 521 
Psychological bulletin, 52(4), 281.  522 
De Los Reyes, A. (2011). Introduction to the special section: More than measurement error: 523 
Discovering meaning behind informant discrepancies in clinical assessments of 524 
 24 
children and adolescents. Journal of Clinical Child & Adolescent Psychology, 40(1), 525 
1-9.  526 
De Los Reyes, A. (2013). Strategic objectives for improving understanding of informant 527 
discrepancies in developmental psychopathology research. Development and 528 
psychopathology, 25(03), 669-682.  529 
De Los Reyes, A., Alfano, C. A., & Beidel, D. C. (2010). The relations among measurements 530 
of informant discrepancies within a multisite trial of treatments for childhood social 531 
phobia. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 38(3), 395-404.  532 
 533 
De Los Reyes, A., Thomas, S. A., Goodman, K. L., & Kundey, S. M. (2013). Principles 534 
underlying the use of multiple informants' reports. Annual Review of Clinical 535 
Psychology, 9, 123-149.  536 
DiBartolo, P. M., Albano, A. M., Barlow, D. H., & Heimberg, R. G. (1998). Cross-informant 537 
agreement in the assessment of social phobia in youth. Journal of Abnormal Child 538 
Psychology, 26(3), 213-220.  539 
Dirks, M. A., Boyle, M. H., & Georgiades, K. (2011). Psychological symptoms in youth and 540 
later socioeconomic functioning: do associations vary by informant? Journal of 541 
Clinical Child & Adolescent Psychology, 40(1), 10-22.  542 
Dirks, M. A., De Los Reyes, A., Briggs‐ Gowan, M., Cella, D., & Wakschlag, L. S. (2012). 543 
Annual research review: Embracing not erasing contextual variability in children’s 544 
behaviour–theory and utility in the selection and use of methods and informants in 545 
developmental psychopathology. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 53(5), 546 
558-574.  547 
Edgeworth, F. Y. (1888). The statistics of examinations. Journal of the Royal Statistical 548 
Society, 51(3), 599-635. 549 
 25 
Egloff, B., & Schmukle, S. C. (2002). Predictive validity of an Implicit Association Test for 550 
assessing anxiety. Journal of personality and social psychology, 83(6), 1441.  551 
Eid, M., Lischetzke, T., Nussbeck, F. W., & Trierweiler, L. I. (2003). Separating trait effects 552 
from trait-specific method effects in multitrait-multimethod models: a multiple-553 
indicator CT-C (M-1) model. Psychological methods, 8(1), 38.  554 
Funder, D. C. (1995). On the accuracy of personality judgment: a realistic approach. 555 
Psychological review, 102(4), 652.  556 
Funder, D. C. (2012). Accurate personality judgment. Current Directions in Psychological 557 
Science, 21(3), 177-182.  558 
Garb, H. N. (2005). Clinical Judgment and Decision Making*. Annu. Rev. Clin. Psychol. 559 
2005, 1, 67-89.  560 
Gomez, R., Burns, G. L., Walsh, J. A., & De Moura, M. A. (2003). Multitrait-multisource 561 
confirmatory factor analytic approach to the construct validity of ADHD rating scales. 562 
Psychological Assessment, 15(1), 3.  563 
Greenbaum, P. E., Decrick, R. F., Prange, M. E., & Friedman, R. M. (1994). Parent, teacher, 564 
and child ratings of problem behaviours of youngsters with serious emotional 565 
disturbances. Psychological Assessment, 6(2), 141.  566 
Grills, A. E., & Ollendick, T. H. (2003). Multiple informant agreement and the anxiety 567 
disorders interview schedule for parents and children. Journal of the American 568 
Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 42(1), 30-40.  569 
Hirschmüller, S., Egloff, B., Nestler, S., & Back, M. D. (2013). The dual lens model: A 570 
comprehensive framework for understanding self–other agreement of personality 571 
judgments at zero acquaintance. Journal of personality and social psychology, 104(2), 572 
335.  573 
Jöreskog, K. G. (1969). Efficient estimation in image factor analysis. Psychometrika, 34(1), 574 
51-75.  575 
 26 
Judd, C. M., Smith, E. R., & Kidder, L. H. (1991). Research methods in social relations. Sixth 576 
Edition. New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.  577 
Kahneman, D. (2003). A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality. 578 
American psychologist, 58(9), 697.  579 
Klonsky, E. D., & Oltmanns, T. F. (2002). Informant‐ reports of personality disorder: 580 
Relation to self‐ reports and future research directions. Clinical Psychology: Science 581 
and Practice, 9(3), 300-311.  582 
Kolko, D. J., & Kazdin, A. E. (1993). Emotional/behavioural problems in clinic and nonclinic 583 
children: correspondence among child, parent and teacher reports. Journal of Child 584 
Psychology and Psychiatry, 34(6), 991-1006.  585 
Kraemer, H. C., Measelle, J. R., Ablow, J. C., Essex, M. J., Boyce, W. T., & Kupfer, D. J. 586 
(2003). A new approach to integrating data from multiple informants in psychiatric 587 
assessment and research: Mixing and matching contexts and perspectives. American 588 
Journal of Psychiatry, 160(9), 1566-1577.  589 
Kwon, K., Kim, E. M., & Sheridan, S. M. (2012). A contextual approach to social skills 590 
assessment in the peer group: Who is the best judge? School Psychology Quarterly, 591 
27(3), 121.  592 
Lord, F. M., Novick, M. R., & Birnbaum, A. (1968). Statistical theories of mental test scores.  593 
Luby, J. L. (2012). Dispelling the “they’ll grow out of it” myth: implications for intervention. 594 
American Journal of Psychiatry, 169(11), 1127-1129.  595 
Luby, J. L., Belden, A., Sullivan, J., & Spitznagel, E. (2007). Preschoolers’ contribution to 596 
their diagnosis of depression and anxiety: Uses and limitations of young child self-597 
report of symptoms. Child psychiatry and human development, 38(4), 321-338.  598 
Mason, J., & Scior, K. (2004). ‘Diagnostic overshadowing’amongst clinicians working with 599 
people with intellectual disabilities in the UK. Journal of Applied Research in 600 
Intellectual Disabilities, 17(2), 85-90.  601 
 27 
McConaughy, S. H., Stanger, C., & Achenbach, T. M. (1992). Three-Year Course of 602 
Behavioural/Emotional Problems in a National Sample of 4− to 16-Year-Olds: I. 603 
Agreement among Informants. Journal of the American Academy of Child & 604 
Adolescent Psychiatry, 31(5), 932-940.  605 
Müller, J. M., Achtergarde, S., & Furniss, T. (2011). The influence of maternal 606 
psychopathology on ratings of child psychiatric symptoms: an SEM analysis on cross-607 
informant agreement. European child & adolescent psychiatry, 20(5), 241-252.  608 
Offord, D. R., Boyle, M. H., Racine, Y., Szatmari, P., Fleming, J. E., Sanford, M., & Lipman, 609 
E. L. (1996). Integrating assessment data from multiple informants. Journal of the 610 
American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 35(8), 1078-1085.  611 
Owens, J. S., & Hoza, B. (2003). The role of inattention and hyperactivity/impulsivity in the 612 
positive illusory bias. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 71(4), 680.  613 
Pickles, A., & Angold, A. (2003). Natural categories or fundamental dimensions: On carving 614 
nature at the joints and the rearticulation of psychopathology. Development and 615 
psychopathology, 15(03), 529-551.  616 
Pine, D. S., Helfinstein, S. M., Bar-Haim, Y., Nelson, E., & Fox, N. A. (2009). Challenges in 617 
developing novel treatments for childhood disorders: lessons from research on anxiety. 618 
Neuropsychopharmacology, 34(1), 213-228.  619 
Polanczyk, G. V., Willcutt, E. G., Salum, G. A., Kieling, C., & Rohde, L. A. (2014). ADHD 620 
prevalence estimates across three decades: an updated systematic review and meta-621 
regression analysis. International journal of epidemiology, 43(2), 434-442.  622 
Roberts, B. W., & Caspi, A. (2001). Personality Development and the Person-Situation 623 
Debate: It's Déjà Vu All Over Again. Psychological Inquiry, 12(2), 104-109.  624 
Schmidt, F. L., & Hunter, J. E. (1999). Theory testing and measurement error. Intelligence, 625 
27(3), 183-198. 626 
 28 
Schmitt, M. (2006). Conceptual, theoretical, and historical foundations of multimethod 627 
assessment. In M. Eid & E. Diener (Ed.), Handbook of multimethod measurement in 628 
psychology (pp. 9-25). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 629 
Shadish, W. R., Cook, T. D., & Campbell, D. T. (2002). Experimental and quasi-630 
experimental designs for generalized causal inference: Wadsworth Cengage learning. 631 
Silverman, W. K., & Ollendick, T. H. (2005). Evidence-based assessment of anxiety and its 632 
disorders in children and adolescents. Journal of Clinical Child and Adolescent 633 
Psychology, 34(3), 380-411.  634 
Smith, B. H., Pelham Jr, W. E., Gnagy, E., Molina, B., & Evans, S. (2000). The reliability, 635 
validity, and unique contributions of self-report by adolescents receiving treatment for 636 
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder. Journal of Consulting and Clinical 637 
Psychology, 68(3), 489.  638 
Spearman, C. (1910). Correlation calculated from faulty data. British Journal of Psychology, 639 
1904-1920, 3(3), 271-295.  640 
Strack, F., & Deutsch, R. (2004). Reflective and impulsive determinants of social behaviour. 641 
Personality and social psychology review, 8(3), 220-247.  642 
Stringaris, A. (2015). Emotion regulation and emotional disorders: conceptual issues for 643 
clinicians and neuroscientists in Rutter’s Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, Sixth 644 
Edition, Eds. Thapar A, Pine DS, Leckman JF, Scott S, Snowling MJ, Taylor EA. 645 
Wiley-Blackwell.  646 
Sutcliffe, J. P. (1965). A probability model for errors of classification. I. General 647 
considerations. Psychometrika, 30(1), 73-96. 648 
Vazire, S. (2010). Who knows what about a person? The self–other knowledge asymmetry 649 
(SOKA) model. Journal of personality and social psychology, 98(2), 281.  650 
 29 
Weisbrot, D. M., Gadow, K. D., DeVincent, C. J., & Pomeroy, J. (2005). The presentation of 651 
anxiety in children with pervasive developmental disorders. Journal of Child & 652 
Adolescent Psychopharmacology, 15(3), 477-496.  653 
Youngstrom, E. A., Findling, R. L., Calabrese, J. R., Gracious, B. L., Demeter, C., Bedoya, D. 654 
D., & Price, M. (2004). Comparing the diagnostic accuracy of six potential screening 655 
instruments for bipolar disorder in youths aged 5 to 17 years. Journal of the American 656 
Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 43(7), 847-858.  657 
 658 
  659 
 30 
Acknowledgements  660 
AK wants to thank Stefan Berti, Henning Müller and Jan Matti Dollbaum for their helpful 661 
comments on a version of this paper. 662 
